This study focuses on an analysis of the minimum wage policy and the main income transfer program -called the Universal Child Allowance (UCA) 2 -in Argentina.
It will provide evidence about the impact these measures had on the labour market with a focus on the informal sector. It sought to determine -on the one hand -whether modifications in minimum wage reduced demand for employment and/or encouraged informality in the labour sector. On the other hand, it examined the influence of UCA as determining factors that leads the adult population in beneficiary households to leave or enter the work force. Similarly, the study assessed whether the transfers constitute an incentive for labour informality.
In recent years, the use of minimum wage and income transfer programs has intensified in several countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Argentina is a paradigmatic case as it brings together both phenomena. Both measures are core aspects of income policy in Argentina and given their extension and coverage, contribute to the configuration of the new social protection system that appears to be emerging in Argentina. Together with their growing role in the agenda of Latin American public policies, both initiatives are surrounded by elevated controversy.
The high level of informality that characterizes Latin American labour markets adds to the debate. The high proportion of people who have jobs that are not formal -which is to say they are not declared or registered in official social security records -raise further questions about the impact that establishing a legal minimum wage can have on that labour market segment. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether increases in minimum wage -which by definition only impact workers in formal jobs in the economy -cause any slippage in the salaries of informal workers. It is also important to investigate 2 In Argentina the Universal Child Allowance for Social Protection (hereafter Universal Child Allowance or UCA) was created through Decree 1.602/09 toward the end of 2009. The decree modified the Family Allowance Law (Law 24.714), expanding its benefits to include children whose parents are unemployed or who work in the informal sector with salaries that are below minimum, vital and mobile wage. The UCA is a monthly cash benefit that is paid to parents, tutors, guardians or blood relatives up to the third degree, for each child under 18 who is their responsibility, up to a maximum of five children. There is no age limit when the child is disabled.
whether changes in this labour mechanism lead to transitions between both segments of workers: from the formal to the informal sector and vice versa.
Similarly, the possible contractionary impact of social policies on labour supply has been a recurring concern in specialized literature. It has been suggested that income transfer programs encourage beneficiaries to moderate or even stop their search for work. A narrowing -or closure -of the income gap between inactivity/unemployment/informality and having a job is a central part of our research.
Revision of the Literature

Regarding Minimum Wage
Classic labour market models suggest that establishing a wage floor above the equilibrium wage -understood as that which clears any excess labour supplywill lead to a reduction in the volume of employment.
Part of the empirical research carried out in the 1980s, for the most part based on the U.S. economy, provided evidence that supports this vision (Gallasch, 1975; Gardner, 1981 y Brown et al., 1982 . The reigning consensus at the time was largely based on the thought of Brown et al. (1982) who concluded that the reduction in employment among young people would be between 1 percent and 3 percent as a result of a 10 percent increase in minimum wage in the United States.
Throughout the 1990s, a growing body of work questions this mainstream view, demonstrating that the impact could be null -or in any case negative but with little economic significance. (Lawrence, Katz y Krueger, 1992; Card y Krueger, 1995; Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999) .
During the current century the debate has grown more intense based on research that offers finds contradictory results and is not lacking methodological controversy (Neumark y Wascher, 2006; Dube, Lester y Reich, 2010; Allegretto, Dube y Reich, 2011 and Lemieux, 2011) 3 .
The debate has intensified in economies with segmented labour markets. In effect, if we accept that there are different segments of workers, the imposition of a specific level in the minimum wage could impact them in 3 The theoretic operating models of alternative labour market models to the competitive model that justify the absence of contractionary effects on employment are monopsonistic. In these markets the equilibrium wage is lower than the value of the marginal productivity of labour. As a result, an increase in minimum wage does not necessarily lead to a reduction in employment. Under this hypothesis, the impact of increases in minimum wage are indeterminate (Manning 2003) . From a slightly different perspective, the theory of efficient salaries admits that salary increases can increase productivity and therefore, they also do not lead to a reduction in employment (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) . different manners. 4 The analysis of the impact of minimum wage on segmented labour markets recognizes Welch (1974); Gramlich (1976) and Mincer (1976 and 1984) as offering the most relevant contributions.
Recently there has been a renewed stream of research that has concentrated on the situation of countries in the Latin America region where the level of informality is very high. Comparative studies have been done between countries (Cunningham, 2007; Marinakis y Velasco, 2006; Maloney y Nuñez Méndez, 2004) and of course research centered on national cases has also proliferated: Brazil (Boeri et al, 2011; Lemos, 2009 Lemos, y 2004 Carneiro y Corseuil, 2001; Fajnzylber, 2001) ; Peru (Céspedes, 2006) ; México (Bosch y Manacorda, 2010; Cunningham y Siga, 2006 -y Brazil-) ; Chile (Infante et al., 2003) ; Colombia (Arango y Pachón, 2004) , Costa Rica (Gindling y Terrell, 2007) ; Honduras (Gindling y Terrell, 2009 ; Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl y Walsh, 2001 ) y Nicaragua (Alaniz et al, 2011) . For the Argentinian case we can mention Marshall (2006) and Khamis (2008) .
In international literature, the impact of minimum wage on the salary structure has also been profoundly analysed. On this front, there is a certain level of agreement in recognizing that the salary distribution tends to compress when there are increases in minimum wage (DiNardo et al, 1996; Autor et al, 2010) although some studies emphasize that increases in the lowest remunerations are greater in the informal sector than in the informal. (Lemos, 2009; Boeri et al, 2011) .
Regarding conditional income transfers
Social protection systems based on non-contributory schemes to ensure basic protection for vulnerable populations have grown substantially in the Latin America region in recent years (Barrientos and Hulme, 2009) . In 2001 these plans reached 38 million beneficiaries, but by 2010 this number had grown to 129 million (Stampini and Tornarolli, 2012) . Generally, they are associated with conditions related to education, health and nutrition, usually aimed at children in the household in a bid to stop the inter-generational transmission of poverty. (Villatoro, 2007) . 5 The multiplication of these programs has recently opened a broad debate about the possible impact on the labour market that dates back many years.
In effect, the classical perspective saw them as policies that encourage inactivity 6 while more heterodox visions sustain that they could lead to an increase in the economic participation in certain population groups. Moreover, some would argue that programs that seek to equalize the rights of informal workers with formal workers -in terms of the access the second group has to certain levels of social protection -generate incentives for labour informality (Levy, 2008) .
Data and Methodology
Characteristics of the data source
The data used in the study comes from the Permanent Household Survey -EPH -which is carried out by the National Institute of Statistics and Census -INDEC. Argentina does not have panel surveys but the information coming from EPH makes it possible to obtain data of this nature. The survey does not directly investigate changes in the variables over time but it is possible to construct longitudinal data. The EPH micro databases were used for the period that goes from 2004 to 2013.
When examining minimum wage changes, we turned to the creation of annual panels corresponding to the second quarters for the biennia in the period. 7 Using the second quarters makes it possible to reasonably capture the modifications in the value of the minimum legal salary and facilitates an estimate of its impact on the labour status of individuals (see Chart 1). As a result, it is possible to observe the location of salaried workers regarding legal minimum wage prior to its modification and one year later, which is to say when the change in the value of minimum wage had taken place. -8 . We then added the annual rotation groups in a single data base -pooled data sample. In the regression models we controlled the membership in each annual panel through the inclusion of a dummy variable.
When exploring the effects of the income transfers, we used data from the panel of micro databases corresponding to the third and fourth quarters of 2009 and 2010. The selection of these quarters is based on the moment when the income transfer program that is being analysed was implemented. The UCA took effect in late 2009 and therefore it is possible to identify beneficiary households in 2010, after the program came into effect in 2009 and trace them back a year when the UCA was still not in effect. Similar to the case of involving minimum wage, the rotation groups were added to a single database and in the regression models, membership in each annual panel was controlled through the inclusion of a dummy variable. The data to be used corresponded to the total of the urban centres that the EPH covers.
Methodological Design
The methodological design used in this investigation has two parts. In the first we turned to multinomial logistic regression models with data from the constructed panels. Secondly we used the differences in differences focusdiff in diff -with similar multinomial logistic models but with cross-sectioned micro data from the same information source. 9
Multinomial logistic regression: Minimum wage
The analysis universe was made up of salaried workers covered by regulations related to minimum wage in the initial period, which is to say, prior to its modification. Unless otherwise indicated, salaried workers were selected whose work weeks varied between 35 and 48 hours -taking into account that minimum wage is applied to salaried workers who meet the requirement of a legal working day.
Similar to the scope of the norms on minimum wage, people in domestic service were excluded, as were the beneficiaries of employment plans. Moreover, the universe was restricted to consider salaried workers who were under the age of 60. This made it possible to concentrate attention on the economically active population and avoid transitions toward inactivity due to access to retirement benefits.
The dependent variable was defined as the labour status of individuals after the modification of minimum wage. Four categories were defined. a) To be in a formal, salaried registered job b) To be in an informal job, salaried but not registered c) To not be occupied -unemployed or inactive and c) To be occupied in a non-salaried position -this final group is the base category against which the parameters were estimated.
The independent variable of interest is the one that captures the impact of perceiving remuneration that is below -or in the tranche of the legal minimum wage. 10 The analysis is centred on the monthly salary received by workers in their main occupation, which is the relevant concept used to examine changes in the labour status of individuals.
Through this model it was possible to evaluate if those people with salaries below -or in the tranche -of minimum wage were more exposed to losing their jobs, or to entering the informal sector in the case of formal salaried workers after a variation in minimum wage.
The vector of independent variables was complete with the following: gender, age, age squared, educational level (characterized in the three levels), position in the household, size of the establishment, branch of activity and region of residence. Dummy variables were also included for each of the groups included in the data pool.
Multinomial logistic regression: Income transfer
Two models were defined 11 : in the first withdrawal from the labour market was tested on all those who were employed when the first interview was carried out. As a result, the dependent variable was defined in three categories. a) Unemployed; b) Inactive and c) Employed -as a base category.
In the second model, similarly, it was evaluated whether people moved from inactivity to economic activity after receiving these income transfers. In this case, the universe for analysis was made up of all those who were not employed nor were seeking employment when surveyed for the first observation. The dependent variable was defined in the following three categories.
a) To be unemployed b) To be employed and c) To remain inactive -as a base category
The analysis group was restricted to the group of homes with children and without members who were formally employed -which is to say salaried and registered in social security -between the third and fourth quarter of 2009 and 2010. The vector of independent variables included the usual categories for this type of study: age; age squared, gender, educational level, position in the home and number of children. Moreover, controls were added for geographic regions and rotation groups. The independent variable of interest was defined as that which indicated if the home received subsidies or some social aid in cash. 12 A dummy variable was defined which assumed the value of 1 if the individual resided in a home benefiting from these transfers or 0 in the opposite case.
Differences in differences approach: Minimum wage
The differences in differences approach was applied to the group of salaried workers, in two specific moments -before and after the change in the minimum wage. The treatment group was defined in two categories: salaried workers with remunerations below the legal minimum and workers with salaries in the tranche.
On the other hand, the control group was made of up workers with remuneration above minimum wage. The method made it possible to confirm if the probabilities of entering an informal job were greater for salaried workers with remunerations below/in the tranche of minimum wages -compared with those whose wages are above the minimum -once minimum wage itself was modified.
The analysis was carried out separately for each of the biennia in the 2004 to 2013 period through logistic regressions. It was a cross sectional database for each biennia and included the observations corresponding to the universe indicated in the period before and after the modification of minimum wage. 13 In the vector of independent variables the same were included that were used in the multinomial models described above. The variables of interest were: a) Salaries under the minimum and the year following the modification of the minimum salary. b) Salaries in the tranche of the minimum and a year following the modification of the minimum salary. 13 The use of a cross sectioned data base for each biennia made it possible to have access to a greater number of cases and results than if the model had been applied to dynamic data. Moreover, in computing the double difference with independent databases the identification of the control group was more efficient.
Differences in differences approach: Income transfers
In this case, the differences in differences approach was applied on the group of adult individuals belonging to homes with children where there is no registered salaried worker -which is to say only unemployed adults or those in the informal sector. It referred to two moments in time -the second quarter of each biennium between 2010 and 2013. The treatment group was defined by those adult members of beneficiary households while the control group was made up of adult individuals in households with children who lack members employed in formal work and declared they don't receive income transfers. The method made it possible to confirm whether the probabilities of enjoying a determined labour status varied in time between beneficiary and nonbeneficiary households of UCA.
Results
Minimum wage
Slightly less than a third of salaried workers in Argentina -considering jointly those workers whose remuneration is below minimum wage and those whose income is close to this level and with work weeks that vary between 35 and 48 hours -constitute the universe that would be most exposed to changes in this salary level (see Chart 2). Note that the proportion is slightly more than 40 percent when the impact is observed in the total number of employed. This panorama is slightly different regarding salaried workers registered in the social security system -formal workers -are considered separately from those who are not -informal.
The relative stability in the structure of the recipients based on their location regarding minimum wage suggests that nominal increases between 2005 and 2013 accompanied the variations in the remunerations of the global group of salaried workers. One direct way of measuring if this took place is by computing the coefficient between the minimum wage and different points in the distribution of salaries. It is possible to confirm that, after a significant increase in the value of minimum wage compared with average wage between 2004 and 2005, the increase of minimum wage -versus average remunerations -followed a more moderate tendency above 50 percent (see Chart 3).
The minimum wage essentially matched the average wage of the informal workers and more than surpassed that received by salaried workers in the first income decile. See Chart 3.
This alludes to the fact that the Argentinian labour market is segmented and does not operate competitively. Estimates based on Kernel density confirm this. Through its usage, it is possible to graphically represent the location of minimum wage in the distribution of remunerations for formal and informal workers. See Graph 1. 14 It is possible to appreciate that, for the group of registered salaried workers, the minimum wage is located in the extreme lower end of the distribution, leaving only a small proportion of recipients under this threshold. For non-registered workers, minimum wage is located on the descending right high side of the density function. Unlike what happened for registered salaried workers, the magnitude of informal workers with salaries below the minimum was not marginal. Globally, this evidence justifies concluding that minimum wage does not constitute a salary floor for the informal sector in the style of a "beacon", although it could have exercised it in dynamic terms as the salary gap between both segments did not increase.
Graph 1: Kernel density estimation of wages for registered and non-registered workers and the location of minimum wage (2010).
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Recurring to the pool of data, it was possible to estimate the proportion of those who maintained or changed their location in the salary tranches regarding the legal minimum before and after its modification (see Chart 4). It is possible to confirm that around one out of every 5 salaried workers (23.2 percent) who in the initial year received wages below the legal minimum entered the segment of those who earned more than minimum wage in the following year. In contrast, 6.9 percent of those who had received salaries above the minimum then moved into the group with salaries below the minimum one-year later.
The estimated probabilities with the logistic multinomial regression models support the absence of significant negative impacts on the loss of employment among formal salaried workers. In effect, registered salaried workers with remunerations at or below the minimum tranche -who are more impacted by changes in the legal minimum -did not demonstrate greater probabilities of losing their condition as the employed, which is to say they did not demonstrate greater probability of entering unemployment or inactivity. The coefficients were not significant (see Chart 6).
The panorama is slightly different when the analysis focuses on the impact regarding access to a non-registered job. A previously stated, registered salaried workers with an income that is below minimum wage and those with remunerations in the minimum wage tranche represented something less than 6 percent to 8 percent respectively in 2013. They exhibited positive and significant probabilities of entering an informal position (0.74 in the first group and much less -0.44-in the second group.) This situational data is complemented by the fact that those registered salaried workers with remunerations below the minimum had less probabilities of remaining in this condition (-0.309 ). This panorama suggests that minimum wage had exercised an impact on the margin -light and with little economic significanceregarding the labour status of workers.
Through a differences in differences analysis it is possible to reinforce the conclusion obtained from the panel data about the limited impact that changes in minimum wage could have on the level of informality.
Transfer of Income
The impact of the UCA on the activity-inactivity trajectory was evaluated for those members of homes who are able to access the program. The regression models made it possible to confirm that the UCA was not associated with a greater probability of moving from employment to inactivity -the coefficient was not significant (see Chart 8).
In other words, the perception of this transfer -controlled by the remainder of the factors included in the analysis -did not lead adult workers to exit economic activity. On the other hand, it did confirm a greater propensity to go from employment to unemployment. The interpretation of this derivation makes sense when we note that the jobs held by adults in these homes tend to be characterized by very low stability. Similar results were found in the separate analysis for men and women.
In the other direction, in the move from inactivity toward unemployment and employment, it is possible to confirm that the monetary transfer had a positive and significant sign (see Chart 8). This is to say that they were associated with a greater probability of entering economic activity. In the separate analysis for men and women, it was confirmed that this would have occurred due to what happened with the first. This lends credence to the hypothesis about the predomination of certain cultural patterns that assigned men the role of breadwinner while women are assigned the role of taking care of the children and other domestic tasks. 16 The differences in differences analysis confirms the absence of positive effects on the probabilities of becoming inactive in two of the three analysed biennia (see Chart 9). In fact, it confirms a negative and significant effect in the 2012-2013 period.
Conclusions and policy implications
In the current century, both the regulation of minimum wage and income transfer to poor homes have been consolidating in the Latin American region as fundamental tools for achieving basic or minimal social protection guarantees.
The Argentina case stands out in this context due to the intense use of both policies, given the coverage that is reached and the amount assigned in each case. Despite the recently described panorama, the persistence of a high level of labour informality amply justifies the development of the research in order to study the impact on the labour market and glean any policy implications.
The application of minimum wages tends to provoke intense debate. While some literature emphasizes that it reduces employment and provokes and increase in inequality, other claim that it doesn't have any negative impact on employment and also contributes to protecting the remuneration of less skilled workers. The question is further complicated by the possible impact it could have on labour informality.
Evidence obtained in the Argentinian case revealed that throughout this period, somewhat less than a third of the total number of salaried workers, considering all workers who receive less than minimum wage or in the legal minimum tranche as one group, are exposed to the possible impact from the modification of its amount.
For its part, econometric estimates demonstrated that the modifications of the minimum wage did not produce any negative impact on employment. Moreover, it is possible to emphasize that there also was no substantial impact on the probabilities of losing a formal job and entering the informal sector -the 16 It is worth emphasizing that this analysis is limited to one-year interval between observations. The question as to whether the impact could change over a greater time period remains open. (Galasso, 2006) . impact was modest and only involved a very small proportion of salaried workers. Finally, the information obtained in this research confirmed that the salary gap between formal and informal workers did not increase.
Regarding the income transfers, the controversy has focused on the impact that the income transfer could have on the decisions to participate in the labour market. The results that were obtained demonstrate that there was no movement toward economic activity attributable to the UCA. To the contrary, some evidence was found that it could have encouraged a move to economic activity -from inactivity toward unemployment, of the men in the beneficiary homes.
As a whole, this evidence manifests in favour of encouraging the continuity of these initiatives. Moreover, due to the positive impact -although modestthat was found regarding the economic activity in certain groups of the population concerning UCA, it would be worth asking about the impact that could be obtained if the application of this policy scheme were amplified.
Finally, it is important to draw attention to the existing quota of informality in the Argentinian labour market as a distinctive element for the design of policy recommendations.
As a result, the use of specific policies to achieved higher marks in the level of labour formalization that mitigate the loss of wellbeing derived from the disadvantages associated with informality emerges as corollary. This will result in a greater effectiveness of the analysed policies -ie greater coverage of minimum wage and greater available resources due to the reduction of informal workers -thereby contributing to achieving growing levels of equity and social integration. Note: Data is controlled by gender, age, age squared, education level (categorized in three levels) position in the home, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of residence and for each of the waves included in the data pool. (1). Universe: adults age 18 to 59 belonging to homes with children where there are no members employed in formal jobs (registered in social security). Control group: adults from homes that do not benefit from UCA.
Note: Data controlled by gender, age, age squared, education level (categorized in three levels) position in the home, size of the establishment, type of activity, region of residence and for each of the waves included in the data pool.
Source: own elaboration
